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Abstract This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice
versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high in-
come countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are
tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship
between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of
corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, how-
ever, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income,
but not in high income countries.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the relationship between the size of the shadow economy and cor-
ruption.1 We thereby combine two important topics. The first deals with the impact of cor-
ruption on the shadow economy; the second with the influence of the shadow economy on
corruption. In both parts of the literature there are important gaps. Regarding the impact of
corruption on the shadow economy, first, previous studies employ rather small samples. For
example, Johnson et al. (1997) find that corruption affects the shadow economy positively
(and the official economy negatively)—in a cross section of, however, only 15 countries.
Similar results are presented in Johnson et al. (1998), with 39 countries in the relevant equa-
tion. Employing instrumental variables techniques and even reliable control variables was
thus infeasible.
Second, the few studies investigating the impact of corruption on the shadow economy
focus on rather heterogeneous country samples. There is no separation of high income and
low income countries, the exception being Friedman et al. (2000), distinguishing Latin
America, OECD and transition countries. However, Friedman et al. (2000) have only 15,
20 and, respectively, seven observations in their sample, so their results are far from re-
liable. Indeed, there is good reason to expect the relationship between corruption and the
shadow economy to differ in high and low income countries. In high income countries,
bribing government officials when detected engaging in the shadow market is rarely an op-
tion. Corruption might thus be independent of the size of the shadow economy. As Choi
and Thum (2005) and Dreher et al. (2008) show, however, the shadow economy can mit-
igate government-induced distortions, so that corruption and the shadow economy could
also be substitutes. Clearly, in high income countries entrepreneurs do not have to pay the
bribes demanded by officials as they could always bring the corrupt officials to court. Con-
sequently, they can choose by themselves whether to pay a bribe or operate underground. In
low income countries, to the contrary, entrepreneurs engaging in the shadow economy can
reasonably expect to escape prison when their illegal activity is detected. Officials collude
with entrepreneurs and taxpayers in exchange for a bribe (e.g., Hindriks et al. 1999). By col-
luding with firms, corrupt bureaucrats can allow them to exploit profitable opportunities in
the unofficial sector (Hibbs and Piculescu 2005). To what extent corruption and the shadow
economy are complements or substitutes is thus likely to vary between high and low income
countries.
Third, the existing evidence is contradictory and insufficient. Friedman et al. (2000) claim
“corruption is associated with more unofficial economy.” However, in the relevant instru-
mental variables regression, when controlling for the income level, this holds for only three
out of eight indices employed (ibid.: 480). Further investigation—with a larger sample of
countries—is needed.
Turning to the impact of the shadow economy on corruption, empirical evidence is virtu-
ally non-existent and the literature is not developed beyond the postulation of formal mod-
els. The exception is the recent analysis in Dreher et al. (2008), showing that corruption
decreases with the size of the shadow economy.
Finally, the use of perceptions-based indices of corruption has recently been challenged.
As one problem with these indices, it is not obvious what they actually measure. Arguably,
1We define corruption as the abuse of public power for private gains. Arguably, corruption, in the common
usage of the word, can mean different things in different contexts. For a discussion of some of the alternative
denotations of the problem of corruption and its damaging consequences see the insightful survey by Bardhan
(1997). See also Klitgaard (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Otáhal (2007).
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opinions of citizens in countries with different institutional environments might vary accord-
ing to their own idiosyncratic definitions. According to Mocan (2004), perceived corruption
is completely unrelated to actual corruption once other relevant factors are controlled for.
Similarly, Weber Abramo (2005) shows that perceived corruption is not related to the preva-
lence of bribery.2 To analyze empirically the relationship between corruption and the shadow
economy using a measure of corruption that is not based on perceptions is thus clearly war-
ranted.
This paper makes an attempt to fill these gaps. We employ a substantial number of esti-
mates of the size of the shadow economy based on the same method and all coming from
the same source. We employ a cross-section of 98 countries over the 1999–2002 period to
empirically analyze the relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow econ-
omy.3 We use an index of corruption based on a structural model in addition to the usual
perceptions-based measures. The index has been developed in Dreher et al. (2007) and is
based on the likely causes and consequences of corruption. The country sample is split into
high and low income countries in order to gain additional insights about the relationship
between corruption and the shadow economy.
To anticipate the results, there is no robust relationship between corruption and the
shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an
index of corruption based on a structural model, however, the results show that corruption
and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, while there is no
robust relationship in high income countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we derive our hypotheses, while Sect. 3
discusses the data and method of estimation. In the fourth section we present the empirical
results. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
Theoretically, corruption and the shadow economy can either be complements or substitutes.
Choi and Thum (2005) present a model where the option of entrepreneurs to go underground
constrains a corrupt official’s ability to ask for bribes. Dreher et al. (2008) extend the model
to the explicit specification of institutional quality. The model shows that corruption and
the shadow economy are substitutes in the sense that the existence of the shadow economy
reduces the propensity of officials to demand sub rosa payments.
Johnson et al. (1997), to the contrary, model corruption and the shadow economy as
complements. In their full-employment model, labor can either be employed in the official
sector or in the underground economy. Consequently, an increase in the shadow economy
always decreases the size of the official market. In their model, corruption increases the
shadow economy, as corruption can be viewed as one particular form of taxation and regula-
tion (driving entrepreneurs underground). According to Hibbs and Piculescu (2005), corrupt
bureaucrats can overlook unofficial production in exchange for a bribe, so that corruption in-
creases the size of the underground sector. Hindriks et al. (1999) also show that the shadow
economy is a complement to corruption. This is because, in this case, the taxpayer colludes
with the inspector so the inspector underreports the tax liability of the taxpayer in exchange
for a bribe.4
2See Søreide (2005) for further criticism of perceptions-based indices of corruption.
3Appendix D contains a list of countries included in the empirical analysis.
4See Dreher and Siemers (2009) for a formalization of this argument. See also El-Shagi (2005).
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Theoretically, the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is thus unset-
tled. There is, however, reason to believe that the relationship might differ among high and
low income countries. In high income countries, the official sector provides public goods
like the rule of law, enforcement of contracts, and police protection. Usually, only craftsmen
or very small firms have (or take) the option of going underground. In this case, the shadow
economy is hidden from tax inspectors and other officials. In other words, there are no bribes
necessary or possible to buy one’s way out of the official sector. In high income countries—
typically showing comparably small levels of corruption—individuals confronted with a
corrupt official have the option of bringing the official to court. Moreover, in high income
countries corruption quite often takes place to bribe officials to get (huge) contracts from the
public sector (e.g., in the construction sector), which are then handled in the official econ-
omy and not in the shadow economy. Hence, corruption in high income countries can be a
means of achieving certain benefits which make work in the official economy easier, e.g.,
winning a contract from a public authority, getting a licence (e.g., for operating taxes, pro-
viding other services, or getting permission to convert land into “construction ready” land).5
In high income countries people thus bribe in order to be able to engage in more official
economic activities. As Schneider and Enste (2000) point out, at least two-thirds of the in-
come earned in the shadow economy is immediately spent in the official sector. The shadow
economy and the official sector might thus be complements. The corresponding increase
in government revenue and strengthened institutional quality is likely to decrease corrup-
tion. The prediction of a negative (substitution) relation between corruption and the shadow
economy is in line with the models of Choi and Thum (2005) and Dreher et al. (2008).
In low income countries, to the contrary, we expect different mechanisms to prevail. In-
stead of working partly in the official sector and offering additional services underground as
in high income countries, enterprises completely engage in underground activity.6 Examples
of enterprises operating completely underground are restaurants, bars, or haircutters—and
even bigger production companies. As one reason for this, the public goods provided by the
official sector are in many developing countries less efficient as compared to high income
countries. Big companies, however, are comparably easy to detect and—in order to escape
taxation and punishment—they have to bribe officials, thereby increasing corruption. Cor-
ruption often takes place in order to pay for activities in the shadow economy, so that the
shadow economy entrepreneur can be comparably sure not to be detected by public authori-
ties. Here, the shadow economy and corruption are likely to reinforce each other, as corrup-
tion is needed to expand shadow economy activities and—at the same time—underground
activities require bribes and corruption. To get some additional income from the shadow
economy entrepreneur, it is natural for public officials to ask for bribes and thus benefit
from the shadow market. In low income countries, we therefore expect a positive (com-
plementary) relation between corruption and the shadow economy. This corresponds to the
predictions of the models of Hindriks et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (1997) and Hibbs and
Piculescu (2005).
In summary we expect:
Hypothesis 1 In low income countries, shadow economy activities and corruption are com-
plements.
5The argument is related to theories according to which corruption oils the wheels of the system (see, e.g.,
Méon and Sekkat 2005; Méon and Weill 2006).
6See, e.g., Gerxhani (2003), Johnson et al. (1997), and Schneider (2005b).
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Hypothesis 2 In high income countries, shadow economy activities and corruption are sub-
stitutes.
The next section outlines our method of estimation and presents the data.
3 Data and estimation technique
We estimate OLS regressions for a cross-section of countries taking the following form7:
Yi = α + β1Xi + β ′2Zi + εi, (1)
where Y and X represent either corruption or, respectively, the shadow economy and Z is
a vector of control variables. In order to increase the number of observations, all data are
averages over the 2000–2002 period.
Data for the shadow economy are taken from Schneider (2005a, 2005b). Schneider cal-
culates the size and development of the shadow economy of 145 countries. In a first step
Schneider (2005b) estimates the size of the shadow economy with the help of the MIMIC
method.8 While the MIMIC approach produces estimated relative sizes of the shadow econ-
omy, another step is necessary to get to absolute values. In order to calibrate absolute figures
of the size of the shadow economies from the relative MIMIC estimation results, Schneider
uses previous estimates for a number of countries (e.g., Australia, Austria, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, India, Peru, Russia and the United States).9
The resulting average size of the shadow economy as a percentage of official GDP in the
37 African states is 41% in 1999/2000, and 43% in 2002/2003. In Central and South America
the size of the shadow economy amounts to 41% in 1999/2000 (and 43% in 2002/2003). In
Asia the average value is much lower (29% for the year 1999/2000; 30% in 2002/2003).
Regarding the transition countries among the sample, the respective values were 38% and
40%; for the OECD 17% and, respectively, 16%. Looking at the unweighted average of the
145 countries in the sample, the average size of the shadow economy was 34% in 1999/2000
and 35% in 2002/2003.
To measure corruption, we employ a well-known and widely used index provided by the
International Country Risk Guide. This indicator is based on the analysis of a world-wide
7In the working paper version of this paper, we also estimated panel regressions. However, missing observa-
tions substantially reduced the number of countries included in the analysis, challenging the reliability of the
results. We therefore decided to omit the panel regressions.
8The dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes (MIMIC) method is based on the statistical theory of un-
observed variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be mea-
sured. For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach is used to measure the hidden economy as an unobserved
variable over time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within which the
“unobserved” variable cannot be measured directly. The MIMIC model consists in general of two parts, with
the measurement model linking the unobserved variables to observed indicators. The structural equations
model specifies causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved
variable—the size of the shadow economy—which is assumed to be influenced by a set of causes and indica-
tors for the shadow economy’s size. The exact causal and indicator variables used are listed in the definitions
of Appendix B.
9These external estimates are derived employing the currency demand method. For the sources of these
external estimates see Schneider (2005b, p. 21).
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network of experts.10 On the original scale, the index has a range from 0—representing high-
est corruption—to 6 (no corruption). We rescaled the index, so that higher values represent
greater corruption. We have 98 countries in our sample for which both data for the shadow
economy, corruption, and the relevant control variables are available.
We take account of the recent critique of perceptions-based indices of corruption employ-
ing an alternative indicator below. The index has been developed in Dreher et al. (2007) and
is based on a structural model. The statistical method applied infers the magnitude of cor-
ruption from both the likely causes and likely effects of corruption.11 The index is available
for about 100 countries for the year 2000 and ranges from 1 to 10, where higher values rep-
resent higher corruption. The Multiple Causes, Multiple Indicators (MIMIC) method used
to derive the index is similar to the one employed in Schneider (2005a, 2005b) to estimate
the size of the shadow economy. While having the advantage of being largely independent
of perceptions, the index arguably also implies drawbacks, in particular the necessarily ad
hoc decision of which causes and indicators to employ.12
Regarding our control variables, we follow Johnson et al. (1997, 1998) and Friedman et
al. (2000). Our covariates thus belong to three groups: tax rates and government revenues,
measures of regulation, and proxies for institutional quality.13 Our measures of institutional
quality and regulatory burden are from Gwartney and Lawson (2004), the Heritage Founda-
tion (2005), Marshall and Jaggers (2008), and Kaufmann et al. (2003). Except for the index
of corruption, we have kept the original signs of the variables, so that different organizations’
ratings differ as to whether a high numerical value corresponds to “better” values.
Johnson et al. (1997, 1998) argue that the shadow economy can be expected to be larger
when there is more regulation and thus more discretion for officials. Politicians might use the
right to regulate to pursue their own interest, such as supporting allies. Politicians can also
use the right to regulate to enrich themselves by offering relief from regulation in exchange
for bribes (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Dreher and Siemers 2009). We thus expect regula-
tions to imply a larger shadow economy, and greater corruption. Specifically, we employ
seven measures produced by the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute. The Fraser
Institute’s measures range from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate fewer regulations. The
indices refer to regulations in the credit market, minimum wage regulation, price regulation,
administrative procedures, and the time spent with government bureaucracy. We take two
indices from Heritage. The first measures wage and price regulation, the second is an over-
all measure of the degree of regulations in the economy. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with
higher values indicating regulations that are worse for business.
As firms in the unofficial sector largely escape taxation, a higher share of the informal
sector should be correlated with lower tax revenue (relative to GDP). However, a heavy fiscal
burden is likely to drive enterprises underground, a result obtained by Loayza (1996) for
Latin America and by Johnson et al. (1997) for transition economies. A huge fiscal burden
10Note that the focus of this index is on capturing political risk involved in corruption. Since it is the only
perception-based data on corruption providing consistent time series, the index has nevertheless been widely
used in empirical studies.
11More specifically the causal indicators include the rule of law and school enrollment, while the conse-
quences employed refer to cement consumption, private credit availability, GDP per capita, and capital ac-
count restrictions.
12For a more detailed critique, see Helberger and Knepel (1988).
13We focus on formal institutions here. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between informal
institutional quality and the underground economy see D’Hernoncourt and Méon (2008). In particular,
D’Hernoncourt and Méon find that generalized trust reduces the size of the shadow economy.
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should thus increase the size of the shadow economy. Regarding corruption, bribes are paid
to avoid paying taxes, so that corruption should increase with the fiscal burden. We use the
Heritage Foundation’s measure of fiscal burden, referring to average and marginal corporate
and personal income taxation. Its index of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade captures
international trade taxation and regulation. A higher score (on a scale of 1–5) implies more
burdensome taxation, i.e., higher average and marginal tax rates and, respectively, higher
taxes on trade. The Fraser Institute’s measures of taxes (Gwartney and Lawson 2004) show
higher scores for countries with lower tax rates, on a scale of 1–10. We employ their indices
for the top marginal income tax rate and taxes on international trade. In addition, we employ
tax revenue and overall revenue (both relative to GDP) from the World Bank’s (2003) World
Development Indicators.
Better institutional quality, finally, increases the benefits entrepreneurs can derive from
operating in the official sector, most likely leading to a reduction of the unofficial sector.14
Almost by definition, better institutions also imply lower levels of corruption.15 Better insti-
tutional quality should thus reduce corruption and the size of the shadow economy alike.
Regarding institutional quality, we employ three indices constructed by the Fraser In-
stitute, and two from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003). On the scale of the Fraser
indices (0–10), higher values imply a “better” legal system. We employ their indices for
judicial independence, impartial courts, and the integrity of the legal system. The World
Bank’s government effectiveness and rule of law indicators range from −2.28 to 2.59 and,
respectively, −2.04 to 2.36, with higher scores showing “better” environments. We also use
the Polity IV index of democracy, ranging from −10 to 10, with higher values indicating
more democracy.
Again following the previous literature, each regression also includes the log of per capita
GDP, taken from the World Bank’s (2003) World Development Indicators. Appendix B lists
all variables with their exact sources and definitions; Appendix C reports descriptive statis-
tics.
In order to select the specific control variables among the substantial list provided above,
we included all variables at the same time and followed a general-to-specific-approach, elim-
inating those variables with the smallest t -value until we end up with a model containing
only those variables (in addition to per capita GDP, the index of corruption and, respectively,
the shadow economy) that are significant at the 10% level at least.
The sample is then split in two income (per capita) groups to test our hypotheses.16 We
follow the World Bank’s definition of lower middle income countries and include countries
in the first group when their 2004 GNI per capita does not exceed US $3,255, and in the
second otherwise. Depending on which covariates are included in the regressions, there are
between 43 and 71 countries in the low income group. The number of countries with high
income is between 23 and 27. Due to the substantially reduced number of observations we
have to interpret the results of some regressions cautiously.
Arguably, the determinants of corruption and, respectively, the shadow economy, might
differ among low and high income countries. Consequently, running separate general-to-
specific analyses and including the most important variables for the particular sub-samples
14Such benefits can be direct and, in addition, indirect, by increasing, e.g., economic growth or foreign direct
investment (Méon and Sekkat 2004).
15Arguably, the absence of corruption is one feature of institutional quality. More specifically, we therefore
control for aspects of institutional quality other than corruption in the empirical analysis below.
16We choose to split the sample instead of using interaction terms as specification tests reject most of the
regressions including all countries but accept most sub-sample regressions.
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comes to mind. However, the regressions for the sub-samples cannot be estimated as the
number of variables exceeds the number of observations in the full models. We therefore
added all excluded variables one at the time to the model derived from the general-to-specific
analysis for the full sample and kept those that are significant at the 10% level at least. As
will be seen below, the results for the sub-samples are in most cases identical to the full
sample.
As a potential problem with our data, some of the variables entering the regressions
below have been used to construct the measure of the shadow economy employed here, and
are included in constructing the measure of corruption (based on a structural model) at the
same time. While the indices are not simply linear combinations of the underlying causes
and indicators, but are constructed by attributing the correlation of the causes and indicators
to the latent variables “shadow economy” and, respectively, “corruption,” it would not be
surprising for these variables to show up as significant determinants of the latent variables.
Excluding these control variables, however, would result in omitted variable bias. In any
case, our main interest is not in these control variables, but in the effects of corruption and,
respectively, the size of the shadow economy on each other. Still, we test for the robustness
of our main results by using an alternative measure of the size of the shadow economy, based
on the physical input method.
Clearly, taking corruption and the shadow economy as exogenous determinants of each
other contradicts our a priori hypotheses. We therefore employ instrumental variables to deal
with the potential endogeneity of corruption and the shadow economy. As an obvious prob-
lem, identifying valid instruments is a real challenge: finding something that affects corrup-
tion and that has no relationship with the informal economy other than through corruption is
difficult; similarly, it is difficult to find something that affects the informal economy and has
no relationship with corruption other than through the informal economy. We employ two
sets of instruments for each variable. First, the determinants of corruption and the shadow
economy identified in the general-to-specific-approach are employed. Second, we use the in-
struments for corruption suggested by Friedman et al. (2000): Ethnic and religious fraction-
alization, a country’s latitude, and French, socialist, German, and Scandinavian legal origin.
The variables have been shown to be correlated with institutional development across a wide
range of countries (La Porta et al. 1999). Regarding the shadow economy, a range of vari-
ables determining the costs of doing business in a country have recently been developed by
the World Bank (Djankov et al. 2002). According to the results of Friedman et al. (2000) en-
trepreneurs go underground mainly to reduce the burden of bureaucracy. The variables mea-
suring the costs of and the time required to open a business as well as flexibility with respect
to hiring and firing workers thus appear to be natural instruments for the shadow economy.
We employ them as our second set. Clearly, it is not a priori obvious that all of these vari-
ables are valid instruments.17 We rely on the usual statistical tests to answer this question.
Our second equation takes the form:
Xi = γ ′1Ii + εi, (2)
with I representing the vector of instrumental variables. F -tests on the joint significance of
our instruments show that they are good predictors of the degree of corruption and, respec-
tively, the shadow economy. As the F -tests in the tables below indicate, the Staiger-Stock
critical value of 10 is easily passed in the full samples, but not in the samples split according
17For example, corrupt government officials might intentionally increase the amount of regulation and red
tape in order to be able to extract bribes (see Dreher and Siemers 2009), and will thereby drive firms under-
ground.
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to income. In most (but not all) cases, the overidentifying restrictions are also not rejected
at conventional levels of significance.
The next section presents the results.
4 Empirical results
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the OLS results of the full model explaining the size of the
shadow economy resulting from the general-to-specific analysis. In the overall sample, only
three variables are significantly correlated with the unofficial sector, at the 1% level. As can
be seen, the shadow market shrinks with stronger regulations in the credit market, contra-
dicting our a priori expectation. Government effectiveness reduces the size of the informal
sector. This is intuitive: the more effective the government, the greater the benefits of oper-
ating in the legal sector. Moreover, the risk of getting caught engaging in illegal activities is
greater with more effective governments. Stronger minimum wage regulation also increases
the size of the shadow economy. The results also show, surprisingly, that our measures of tax
burden are not selected by the general-to-specific analysis. As Hibbs and Piculescu (2005)
argue, high tax rates do not necessarily imply large shadow economies, as the incentives to
evade taxes and produce in the shadow economy depend on tax rates relative to firm-specific
benefits available to firms producing in the official sector.
Turning to the results for low and, respectively, high income countries—also reported
in column 1—only one additional variable is significant at the 10% level at least when
adding one variable at the time as described above to the regression for the low income
sample. No additional variable is selected in the sample including only countries with high
income. The results for the sample of countries with low income are similar to the full
sample, with the exception that per capita GDP is now significant at the 10% level, with the
expected negative coefficient. In addition, the size of the shadow economy decreases at the
10% level of significance with stricter regulations of wages and prices, as measured by the
Heritage Index. Given that we already control for minimum wage regulation by including
the respective Fraser index, this result is likely to be due to price rather than wage regulation.
Still, it is surprising.
In the high income sample, credit market regulations and minimum wage regulations are
not significant at conventional levels, while GDP per capita is significant at the 10% level,
again with the expected negative coefficient.
With few exceptions, the results are identical when employing the 2SLS approach in
columns 2 and 3. However, employing the first set of instruments (column 2), minimum
wage regulation enters positively in high income countries (at the 10% level of significance).
Using the second set of instruments (column 3), credit market regulations are no longer sig-
nificant at conventional levels in the overall sample, GDP per capita is not significant at
conventional levels throughout, and wage and price regulations are marginally insignificant
in the low income sample. The Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions
at conventional levels of significance in all but the final regression (column 3, high income
countries), where the restrictions are rejected at the 10% level of significance, but not at the
5% level. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the correlation between the two sets of instru-
ments and the residuals of the full model. According to the table, the correlation between the
instruments and the residuals is reasonably low. The table also shows the comparably high
correlation between most of the instruments and the dependent variable (corruption). The
Anderson canonical correlations LR statistic and the Cragg-Donald chi-sq statistic—both
tests of whether the equation is identified, do not reject the specification at conventional
levels of significance.
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Turning to one of our variables of main interest, Table 1 shows that corruption does
not significantly affect the size of the shadow economy. As the only exception, corrup-
tion seems to reduce the size of the shadow economy in high income countries accord-
ing to column 3. However, as the instruments are rejected in this specification, this re-
sult is likely to be spurious. The insignificant result is in contrast to the results of John-
son et al. (1998) reporting corruption to be among the major determinants of the unof-
ficial sector. However, their regressions neglect the impact of institutional and govern-
mental quality. Once institutional quality and government effectiveness are taken into ac-
count corruption apparently has no significant impact on the size of the shadow economy.
The results support Bjørnskov (2006), showing that a perceptions-based index of corrup-
tion cannot be separated statistically from other indices of governance. Similarly, Weber
Abramo (2005) argues that perceptions-based indices reflect the quality of a country’s in-
stitutions rather than its actual degree of corruption. Controlling for other dimensions of
institutional quality, corruption consequently has no effect on the size of the shadow econ-
omy.
Table 2 reports the results for the full model explaining perceived corruption.18 Estimated
with OLS (column 1), price regulation is positively correlated with corruption in the overall
sample, while corruption is lower with better rule of law, greater democracy,19 and heavier
fiscal burden, at least at the 10% level of significance. At conventional levels of signifi-
cance, GDP per capita has no impact on corruption in the overall sample—and neither does
the shadow economy. However, a larger shadow economy is negatively correlated with cor-
ruption in high income countries, with a coefficient significant at the 1% level. Corruption
and the shadow economy thus seem to be substitutes in high income countries. Quantita-
tively, a ten percentage point increase of the shadow economy (relative to GDP) reduces the
index of corruption by 0.7 points in high income countries, with a standardized regression
(beta) coefficient of 0.47. However, columns 2 and 3 show that this result does no longer
hold when instrumenting for the size of the shadow economy. This is true in the overall
sample as well as in high and low income countries.
In summary, corruption and the size of the shadow economy do not seem to signifi-
cantly affect each other in our cross-section of countries. Potentially, this result might be
due to the use of a specific index, the ICRG index of perceived corruption. We therefore
test for the robustness of our results employing two alternative indicators of perceived
corruption. The first is the corruption perceptions index developed by Transparency In-
ternational (TI), ranging from zero to ten. The second index is from the World Bank’s
‘governance matters’ database (Kaufmann et al. 2003) with values between −1.85 and
2.58. The results show, however, that there is no significant relationship between corrup-
tion and the shadow economy when the TI index is used (not reported in tables). There
is one exception: In high income countries, corruption decreases with a larger shadow
economy, with a coefficient significant at the 5% level according to the OLS regres-
sion. This result holds when the World Bank index of corruption is used instead. No
other regression, however, shows a significant relation between the World Bank index and
the size of the shadow economy. We therefore do not report these regressions in a ta-
ble.
18As can be seen in Appendix Table A.1, the correlation between the instruments and the residuals is again
reasonably low, while there is a comparably high correlation between most of the instruments and the size of
the shadow economy.
19This is in line with Aidt and Gassebner (2007), arguing that the lack of monitoring capability in autocracies
enables the bureaucracy to generate additional red tape (thus increasing corruption).
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It has been argued that perceptions-based indices are not free of problems. One such
problem refers to the low correlation between perceived corruption and actual corruption.
According to Mocan (2004) the two are completely unrelated once other relevant factors
are controlled for. Similarly, Weber Abramo (2005) shows that perceived corruption is not
related to bribery.20 Our results might thus arise from using perceived corruption, rather than
real corruption. We employ an alternative index of corruption based on a structural model,
as introduced above.
When replicated with the index of corruption based on a structural model the regressions
show that corruption does not significantly influence the size of the underground sector in
any regression. We do therefore not present the results in a table. However, there is a signif-
icant impact of the shadow economy on corruption. The results are presented in Table 3.
As can be seen, corruption increases with the size of the underground sector in the overall
sample, with coefficients significant at the 10% level according to the OLS regression (col-
umn 1) and at the 5% level when using the two sets of instruments (columns 2 and 3). The
disaggregated results show that the positive impact of the shadow economy on corruption
is driven by low income countries, with a coefficient significant at least at the 10% level
in all three regressions. The magnitude of the coefficient is economically relevant. In low
income countries, a one percentage point increase in the shadow economy (in % of GDP)
increases the index of corruption by between 0.06 and 0.12 points. While the Sargan test
does not reject all but one specification at conventional levels of significance, note, though,
that while the instruments are jointly significant at the 10% level at least in the overall and
low income samples, the F -statistics on the instruments in the first stage regressions show
that the instruments are rather weak.
As a final check for robustness, we test whether the impact of the shadow economy on
corruption is robust to the specific measure of the shadow economy employed. We there-
fore use data calculated with the Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method, taken
from Schneider and Enste (2000). This approach takes electric-power consumption as phys-
ical indicator of overall (official plus unofficial) economic activity. Overall economic activ-
ity and electricity consumption have been observed empirically to move in lockstep, with
an electricity to GDP elasticity usually close to one. This means that the growth of total
electricity consumption is an indicator for growth of overall GDP. Subtracting the esti-
mates of official GDP from this overall measure, unofficial GDP can be derived. Unfor-
tunately, these data are available for 48 countries only. Given that our interest is on the
differential impact of the shadow economy in low and, respectively, high income coun-
tries, we complement these data with the MIMIC data used so far when the physical in-
put data are missing. In the full sample, about half of the observations are thus estimated
with the physical input method, while the other half is estimated employing the MIMIC
method.
Table 4 reports the results. As can be seen, the impact of the size of the shadow economy
is not significant at conventional levels according to the OLS results of column 1. However,
using the same sets of instrumental variables as before, the results mirror those reported in
Table 3. We thus conclude that the results are robust as to how we measure the size of the
shadow economy.
20Arguably, surveys are not particularly suitable for comparisons of a large sample of countries, as opinions
of citizens in particular countries vary according to their own different definitions of corruption determined
by their formal and informal institutional environments. Interestingly, perceived corruption is also unrelated
to participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), arguably a measure for intended
reforms against corruption (Pitlik et al. 2009).
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In summary, however, there is at best weak evidence for our a priori hypotheses. Using
perceptions-based indices of corruption, our results show that there is no robust relationship
between corruption and the size of the shadow economy. Employing an index of measured
corruption the results show that the size of the shadow economy does not affect corruption
at conventional levels of significance. However, employing the shadow economy as depen-
dent variable, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low
income, in line with Hypothesis 1. There is no robust significant relationship in high income
countries.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we addressed the dual relationship between corruption and the size of the
shadow economy. We hypothesized that the shadow economy and corruption are substi-
tutes in high income countries. In low income countries, to the contrary, we expected the
shadow economy and corruption to be complements. The empirical findings provide only
weak support for our hypotheses. Our results show that there is no robust relationship be-
tween corruption and the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption
are used. Employing an index of measured corruption, the results show that corruption and
the size of the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, while there
is no robust relationship in high income countries.
What conclusions can we draw from these results? In general we must admit we have
no clear and robust pattern that confirms our hypotheses among the range of indicators
and specifications employed. In low income countries we find that measured corruption
increases with a larger shadow economy, confirming the models of Johnson et al. (1997,
1998), Hindriks et al. (1999) and Hibbs and Piculescu (2005), and suggesting that corruption
and the shadow economy are complements in these countries.
Clearly, one of the most important problems in empirical studies of corruption and the
shadow economy is the unavailability of high quality data over time. Our analysis confirms
the importance of the choice of indicator on the results. If we use measured corruption fig-
ures as calculated by Dreher et al. (2007) instead of indices of perceived corruption our
results show a strongly significant impact of the shadow economy on corruption in low
income countries, while there is no effect when we focus on perceived corruption. Our re-
sults thus lend support to recent evidence that perceived corruption cannot statistically be
separated from other dimensions of institutional quality but might instead reflect peoples’
overall perceptions of a country’s institutional environment (e.g., Bjørnskov 2006). Ideally,
we would thus like to test our hypotheses with consistent panel data of corruption based on
a structural model. However, such data do not exist,21 and given the hidden nature of cor-
ruption and the size of the shadow economy expecting clear-cut results might arguably be
too ambitious.
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Appendix A
Table A.1 Instruments for corruption and the shadow economy
Correlations corruption
Residuals of full model Corruption (ICRG)
Corruption (ICRG) −0.00
Log GDP per capita 0.02 −0.64
Fiscal burden (Heritage) −0.03 0.03
Regulation of prices (Fraser) 0.01 −0.60
Rule of law (World Bank) −0.00 −0.74
Democracy −0.10 −0.54
Corruption (ICRG) −0.00
Ethnic fractionalization 0.13 0.34
Religious fractionalization −0.02 −0.03
Latitude −0.12 −0.50
French legal origin −0.01 0.13
Socialist legal origin −0.18 0.14
German legal origin −0.02 −0.18
Scandinavian legal origin 0.18 −0.47
Correlations shadow economy
Residuals of full model Shadow economy
Shadow economy 0.05
Log GDP per capita −0.15 −0.71
Credit market regulations (Fraser) −0.37 −0.37
Minimum wage regulation (Fraser) −0.04 −0.49
Government effectiveness (World Bank) −0.13 −0.76
Shadow economy 0.01
Starting a business (Duration) −0.21 0.32
Starting a business (Costs) −0.16 0.49
Flexibility to hire −0.19 0.20
Flexibility to fire −0.12 0.43
Notes: The upper panel reports the correlation between the residuals of the full model explaining the shadow
economy (Table 1, columns 2 and 3) and the instruments as well as the correlation between the instruments
and corruption. The lower panel reports the same for the full model explaining corruption (Table 2, columns
2 and 3). All correlations are restricted to the respective estimation sample
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Appendix B: sources and definitions
Variable Description Source
Shadow economy Size of the shadow economy in per-
cent of GDP calculated with MIMIC and
currency demand estimation techniques.
Causes: Share of direct taxation (in percent
of GDP), Share of indirect taxation and cus-
tom duties (in percent of GDP), Burden of
State Regulation (share of public adminis-
trative employment in percent of total em-
ployment), Unemployment quota (in percent
of population between 18 and 64), GDP p.c.
in cross domestic product divided by mid-
year population. Indicators: employment (as
percent of population 18–64), growth rate of
GDP per capita, change of currency (growth




Size of the shadow economy in percent
of GDP calculated with the physical input
method.
Schneider and Enste (2000)
Corruption (ICRG) Measures corruption in the political system
as a threat to foreign investment based on the
analysis of a worldwide network of experts.
Rescaled so that 0 represents no corruption
and 6 highest corruption.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)
Corruption (TI) Corruption Perception Index. Rescaled so
that 0 represents no corruption and 10 high-
est corruption.
Transparency International
Corruption (World Bank) Control of Corruption Index. Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Corruption (DKM) Index inferred from a structural model using
both the likely causes and likely effects of
corruption. Causes: the rule of law, school
enrollment, latitude, legal German origin,
age of democracy. Indicators: Cement con-
sumption, private credit, GDP p.c., capital
account restrictions. The index ranges from
1 to 10, where higher values represent more
corruption.
Dreher et al. (2007)
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product
divided by midyear population. Data are in
constant US dollars.
World Bank (2003)
Fiscal burden (Heritage) The index of the fiscal burden refers to aver-
age and marginal corporate and income tax-
ation where a score of 1 signifies an eco-
nomic environment most conducive to eco-
nomic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies
least economic freedom.
Heritage Foundation (2005)
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Variable Description Source
Democracy 0–10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy score.
Measures the general openness of political
institutions.
Marshall and Jaggers (2008)
Taxes on international
trade (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with lower
tax rates, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Trade barriers (Heritage) Captures international trade taxation and
regulation. A higher score implies a higher
burden of taxation, i.e. higher average and
marginal tax rates and, respectively, higher
taxes on trade.
Heritage Foundation (2005)
Taxes (percent of GDP) Tax revenue in percent of GDP. World Bank (2003)





Show higher scores for countries with less
regulation, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Credit market regulation
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less
regulation, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Regulation of prices
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less
regulation, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Administrative procedures
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with fewer
procedures, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Time with government bu-
reaucracy (Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with less
bureaucracy, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Wage and price regulation
(Heritage)
Index of wage and price regulation where a
score of 1 signifies an economic environment
most conducive to economic freedom, while
a score of 5 signifies least economic free-
dom.
Heritage Foundation (2005)
Regulation (Heritage) Index of regulation where a score of 1 sig-
nifies an economic environment most con-
ducive to economic freedom, while a score
of 5 signifies least economic freedom.
Heritage Foundation (2005)
Rule of law (World Bank) Ranges from −2.58 to 2.48, with higher
scores showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Government effectiveness
(World Bank)
Ranges −2.31 to 2.22, with higher scores
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Judicial independence
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with
greater judicial independence, on a scale of
1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Impartial courts (Fraser) Show higher scores for countries with
greater impartiality, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Integrity of legal system
(Fraser)
Show higher scores for countries with higher
integrity, on a scale of 1–10.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)




Fractionalizationj = 1 −
∑n
i=1 s2ij with sij
being the share of group i in country j .
Alesina et al. (2003)
Latitude Absolute value of latitude. Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
Legal origin Dummies representing French, German, So-
cialist, and Scandinavian legal origin.
La Porta et al. (1999)
Costs to start business Measures the costs of the start-up of com-
mercial or industrial firms with up to 50
employees and start-up capital of 10 times
the economy’s per-capita Gross National In-
come. All procedures required to register a
firm are counted, including screening pro-
cedures by overseeing government entities,
tax- and labour-related registration proce-
dures, health and safety procedures, and
environment-related procedures. The costs
of these procedures are calculated as per-
centage of income per capita.
Djankov et al. (2002)
Duration to start business Measures the duration of the start-up of
commercial or industrial firms with up to
50 employees and start-up capital of 10
times the economy’s per-capita Gross Na-
tional Income. All procedures required to
register a firm are counted, including screen-
ing procedures by overseeing government
entities, tax- and labour-related registration
procedures, health and safety procedures,
and environment-related procedures. Time is
recorded in calendar days.
Djankov et al. (2002)
Hiring flexibility index The hiring cost indicator measures all so-
cial security payments (including retirement
fund; sickness, maternity and health insur-
ance; workplace injury; family allowance;
and other obligatory contributions) and pay-
roll taxes associated with hiring an em-
ployee. The cost is expressed as a percentage
of the worker’s salary.
Botero et al. (2004)
Firing flexibility index The firing cost indicator measures the cost
of advance notice requirements, severance
payments and penalties due when dismiss-
ing a redundant worker, expressed in weekly
wages.
Botero et al. (2004)
Religious fractionalization Fractionalizationj = 1 −
∑n
i=1 s2ij with sij
being the share of group i in country j .
Alesina et al. (2003)
Public Choice (2010) 144: 215–238 235
Appendix C: Descriptive statistics (estimation sample, Table 2, column 1, full model)
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Shadow economy 33.11 8.55 68.20 14.18
Shadow economy, alternative measure 32.15 9.30 76.00 15.13
Corruption (ICRG) −2.94 −6.00 −0.33 1.20
Corruption (DKM) 4.72 1.00 10.00 1.97
Corruption (World Bank) −0.22 −2.47 1.41 1.09
Corruption (TI) −4.81 −9.95 −0.40 2.34
Log GDP per capita 7.96 4.48 10.60 1.57
Trade barriers (Heritage) 3.11 1.00 5.00 1.16
Administrative procedures (Fraser) 4.07 1.30 7.03 1.04
Wage and price regulation (Heritage) 2.52 1.00 4.00 0.65
Fiscal burden (Heritage) 3.67 1.47 5.00 0.65
Regulation (Heritage) 3.24 1.00 5.00 0.78
Democracy 6.44 0.00 10.00 3.51
Taxes on international trade (Fraser) 7.46 3.30 10.00 1.60
Taxes (percent of GDP) 20.40 7.18 37.66 8.16
Revenue (percent of GDP) 23.54 0.04 43.07 8.91
Credit market regulations (Fraser) 7.11 2.97 9.73 1.46
Minimum wage regulation (Fraser) 3.94 1.90 5.10 0.74
Regulation of prices (Fraser) 5.24 1.33 10.00 1.86
Time with government bureaucracy (Fraser) 5.78 2.80 7.97 1.19
Rule of law (World Bank) 0.27 −1.79 2.13 1.01
Government effectiveness (World Bank) 0.28 −1.62 2.37 0.99
Judicial independence (Fraser) 5.13 0.35 9.30 2.37
Impartial courts (Fraser) 5.28 1.70 8.93 1.91
Integrity of legal system (Fraser) 6.40 1.70 10.00 2.41
Duration to start business 51.36 2.00 203.00 38.34
Costs to start business 60.68 0.00 711.90 109.10
Hiring flexibility index 47.62 17.00 81.00 17.70
Firing flexibility index 37.11 1.00 73.00 18.09
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 0.41 0.00 0.93 0.25
Religious fractionalization 0.43 0.00 0.86 0.23
Latitude 28.19 0.23 60.21 17.36
Legal origin British 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.46
Legal origin French 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.50
Legal origin Socialist 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.32
Legal origin German 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.22
Legal origin Scandinavian 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.20
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Appendix D: Countries included in the analysis





Bangladesh Iran, Islamic Rep. Portugal
Belgium Ireland Romania
Bolivia Israel Russian Federation
Botswana Italy Senegal
Brazil Jamaica Singapore
Bulgaria Japan Slovak Republic
Cameroon Jordan Slovenia
Canada Kenya South Africa
Chile Korea, Rep. Spain
China Kuwait Sri Lanka
Colombia Latvia Sweden
Congo, Dem. Rep. Lithuania Switzerland
Costa Rica Madagascar Syrian Arab Republic
Cyprus Malawi Tanzania
Czech Republic Malaysia Thailand
Denmark Mali Togo
Dominican Republic Mexico Tunisia
Ecuador Morocco Turkey
Egypt, Arab Rep. Namibia Uganda
El Salvador Netherlands Ukraine
Estonia New Zealand United Arab Emirates
Finland Nicaragua United Kingdom
France Niger United States
Gabon Nigeria Uruguay
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